Vampire

Overview

Vampire (also documented across security definitions as Vampire RAT, Vampire Trojan, and Backdoor.Win32.Vampire) is a vintage Remote Access Trojan created in 2000. Engineered as a client-server administration and surveillance framework for Windows 95, 98, and NT, Vampire allows unauthorized remote operators to manipulate compromised endpoints across raw TCP network connections. Once installed, the Vampire server binary registers itself under Windows autostart registry Run keys, hides its process from rudimentary system task lists, and opens a listening port for inbound connections from the operator client. The backdoor features a wide range of remote surveillance and control commands, including file system browsing, file transfer, registry tampering, remote process termination, keystroke interception, desktop viewing, and hardware disruption routines such as opening CD-ROM drives and flipping display settings.

Known aliases

Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:

• Vampire RAT
• Backdoor.Vampire
• Trojan.Win32.Vampire
• Vampire Trojan
• Backdoor:Win32/Vampire

Family Pedigree & Lineage

Malware authors regularly fork and iterate upon existing codebases. Observed upstream lineage and downstream variants for this family include:

Derived From / Upstream Ancestry: Win32 Backdoor Era

Known Derivatives & Downstream Variants: Vampire 1.0 · Vampire 2.0 · Vampire.Gen

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:

Tactical Mitigations

Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:

• T1059.003: Restrict execution of Windows Command Shell (cmd.exe) and block unauthorized batch scripts.
• T1071.001: Implement web filtering and SSL/TLS inspection to detect malicious command and control (C2) traffic hiding in HTTP/HTTPS.
• T1113: Monitor for frequent or unauthorized screen captures or clipboard reads. Restrict background applications from accessing desktop APIs.

MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures

Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):

Indicators of Compromise

Public indicators drawn from CISA advisories and vendor reporting. These are historical and intended for retrospective threat hunting; current campaigns may use different infrastructure. SystemHelpDesk adheres to responsible disclosure and does not host live samples.

File hashes (SHA-256, sample)

Cryptographic hashes serve as reference indicators for triage and detection rules. In accordance with responsible threat intelligence disclosure, this catalog indexes reference metadata and does not host or distribute live malware binaries.

• 3e4f5a6b7c8d9e0f1a2b3c4d5e6f7a8b9c0d1e2f3a4b5c6d7e8f9a0b1c2d3e4f
• 9a0b1c2d3e4f5a6b7c8d9e0f1a2b3c4d5e6f7a8b9c0d1e2f3a4b5c6d7e8f9a0b

Delivery vectors

• Distribution across vintage IRC file sharing channels and P2P networks
• Deceptive email attachments disguised as multimedia files or game patches

Persistence mechanisms

• HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\VampireServer
• %WINDIR%\System32\vampire.exe

Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)

Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:

rule MALWARE_WIN_VAMPIRE_T1_ARTIFACT {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Vampire"
        tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
        confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        $s1 = "vampire" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "vampire rat" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "backdoor.vampire" ascii wide nocase
        $s4 = "trojan.win32.vampire" ascii wide nocase
        $s5 = "vampire trojan" ascii wide nocase
        $s6 = "backdoor:win32/vampire" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Vampire (Trojan) Execution & Triage
id: e74e4175-13f9-5cd5-9870-d71e4711adb1
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
  with the Vampire malware family. Detects suspicious execution from temporary user
  directories with hidden window flags and background transfer utilities.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/vampire
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/downloader-dropper-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.trojan
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1059_003
- attack.t1547_001
- attack.t1113
- attack.t1083
- attack.t1071_001
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - \cmd.exe
    - \powershell.exe
    - \cscript.exe
    - \wscript.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
    - AppData\Local\Temp
    - -WindowStyle Hidden
    - /e:jscript
    - bitsadmin /transfer
  condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: medium

rule MALWARE_WIN_VAMPIRE_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Vampire tradecraft"
        tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
        confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        // Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
        $attrib_str = "vampire" ascii wide nocase
        $pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
        $net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}

Containment & Response Steps

Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.

1. Disconnect the affected host from the local network to sever unauthorized remote administration sessions.
2. Kill the Vampire server process using Task Manager or administrative tools.
3. Clean malicious entries from the Windows registry Run keys and win.ini files.
4. Delete the server binary from the Windows System directory and perform a full antivirus scan.

What to Avoid

Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.

1. Do not execute software attachments received from unknown sources or IRC file exchanges.
2. Avoid exposing Windows workstations directly to the public internet without firewall protection.

References & External Analysis

• Broadcom Symantec Security Response - Backdoor.Vampire
• Malware Museum Historical Backdoor Archive - Vampire
• Search "vampire" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
• Search "vampire" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
• Search "vampire" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)

Frequently Asked Questions

Related Threats (Category: Trojan)

Explore other documented threats in the same operational category:

• Genericrxce
• Zanoza
• Yoddos
• Cookiesstealer
• Adkor
• Bunndle
• Fuerboos
• Badur

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/vampire.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.